because they account for unsuccessful challenges. Important differences in conflict patterns also distinguish the three transition types from one another. The model also makes predictions concerning the relationship between two rivals' conflict levels and the timing of conflict peaks.
Using a case study for each of the three types of transitions, the predictions are tested using MID data supplemented with historical analyses. Empirical support is strong. Substantive conclusions include recommendations for slowing rates of reaction, cautions concerning the dangers of the post-transition phase, and advice for tortoises to conserve their resources. This project also advocates the usefulness of a broader collection of events data than is currently available and the possible need for variables that trace the evolution of bonds that tie nations together. Renlpolitik, is thought of as the currency of politics among nations; and international conflict is the normal outgrowth of power relations. Our understanding of the power-conflict relationship has been hindered by the failure to resolve a long-standing debate between two opposing schools of thought, balance of power theory and power transition theory.' In their review of the distribution of power literature, Siverson and Sullivan state that the &dquo;two theories ... make com- pletely opposite2 predictions about the effect of the equality of power in the international system&dquo; (1983:474) . Scholars favoring the balance of power theory argue that approximate parity brings peace. Others, favoring the power transition theory, believe power parity is a war-prone condition.
Balance of Power Theory
In order to see how two theories could come to such fundamen- ' tally different conclusions, it is necessary to examine them more closely. Balance of power theorists (e.g., Kissinger, 1979 Kissinger, , 1994 Liska, 1962; Waltz, 1979;  Morgenthau, 1985) argue that an approximately equal distribution of power (or capabilities) across a system of nations tends to produce a peaceful equilibrium.3 Extension of this argument from a system of nations to a dyad has been achieved in the deterrence literature (see, for example, George and Smoke, 1974; Snyder, 1961 (Organski, 1958) .
According to Organski (1958) , a nation's power growth is internally driven by the natural processes of development, modernization, and industrialization. A typical nation thereby experiences three stages of development: 1) potential power, 2) transitional growth in power, and 3) power maturity (Organski, 1958:340) . These (Organski and Kugler, 1980:51 (Organski and Kugler, 1980:52 (Garnham, 1976; Geller, 1993; Geller, 1996) . Further generalization from war to conflict behavior has been achieved in the events data movement. Here, conflict ranges from mild disaffection for another nation's policies to interstate war (Azar and Havener, 1976) . Many events data proponents and formal modelers also consider conflict to be the opposite of cooperation (Richardson, 1960; Axelrod, 1984; Goldstein, 1995 Kugler, 1980; Siverson and Sullivan, 1983) . After assessing the quality of the research bolstering each explanation of war, researchers then determine which side in the dispute claims the &dquo;greater weight of evidence&dquo; (Siverson and Sullivan, 1983:475 The stories told by Organski (1958) in The Stages of Development and by Morgenthau (1985) in Politics Among Nations are rich in dynamical descriptions of national growth and competition. The former details the processes of economic, social, and political development. The latter elaborates the forces pushing nations to strive toward power preponderance, and the forces counteracting in order to maintain an equitable balance of power. These two stories have in common the idea of change over time. Contemporary authors attempt to capture these fluctuations by incorporating pseudo-dynamic features into their statistical investigations (Organski and Kugler, 1980; Houweling and Sicamma, 1988; Kim, 1989; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972; Doran and Parsons 1980; Spiezio, 1993 (Organski and Kugler, 1980; Houweling and Sicamma, 1988) , the relative growth rate of the challenger and dominant state (Kim, 1989) , whether or not a nation is at a critical point (a point at which the change in power is greatest or least) in its power cycle (Doran and Parsons, 1980; Spiezio, 1993) , and the level of change in power distribution (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972; Mansfield, 1992 (Mesterton-Gibbons, 1989; Pearl, 1924) , 2) the speculation that national power development evolves over time according to an sshaped curve similar to that generated by the population growth 158 model (Doran, 1971 (Doran, , 1989a (Doran, , 1989b Doran and Parsons, 1980; Organski, 1958) , and 3) two seemingly opposed beliefs relating the likelihood that two rival nations will go to war with the relationship between their power levels-the balance of power explanation of war (Kissinger, 1979 (Kissinger, , 1994 Claude, 1962; Morgenthau, 19858) and the power transition explanation (Organski, 1958; Organski and Kugler, 1980 Organski (1958) proposes that growth in national power is similarly governed. According to him, a nation generally experiences three stages of development: 1 ) power potential, 2) transitional growth, and 3) power maturity, as represented in Figure l (Organski, 1958; Organski and Kugler, 1980 
Conflict Equations
What influences the conflict behavior of each rival? There are two forces acting on a nation's conflict behavior toward its rival: reaction to the conflictfiv11l the rival, tempered by the nation's own abilities and the distribution of power between the nation and its rival.
The first force is explicated here in detail, but the second is only summarized.
Imagine that conflict behavior is simply the flexing of a nation's power. The more power a nation has at its disposal, the more it is actually able to use. In a competitive dyadic rivalry, the use of national power is manifested in conflictual behavior. It can therefore be said that nation X is able to direct increasing amounts of conflict toward nation Y as it is increasingly powerful.9 Because a nation's ability to act conflictually is dependent on its level of power, i.e., cxy(t) = f(px), Morgenthau (1985:192-194 (Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996) . The MID data reflect the highest level of militarized hostilities directed from each of the two states toward the other. By plotting these values across time, I can check for empirical consistency with the power-conflict model's general and specialized deductions concerning conflict behavior.
Because the MID dataset includes only the highest level of hostility by each side and only militarized disputes, I use historical writings to more closely examine the three cases (e.g., Kennedy, 1987; Stoessinger, 1993; Ulam, 1974; Middleton, 1947 
